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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5791
This paper reviews evidence from 44 middle-income 
countries on how the recent financial crisis affected jobs 
and workers’ incomes. In addition to providing a rare 
assessment of the magnitude of the impact across several 
middle-income countries, the paper describes how labor 
markets adjusted and how the adjustments varied for 
different types of countries. The main finding is that 
the crisis affected the quality of employment more than 
the number of jobs. Overall, the slow-down in earning 
growth was considerably higher than that in employment, 
and the decline in gross domestic product was associated 
with a sharp decline in output per worker, particularly 
in the industrial sector. In several counties, hours per 
worker declined and hourly wages changed little. But 
both the magnitude and nature of the adjustments varied 
This paper is a joint product of the Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network; and the Social Protection and Labor Unit, Human Development Network. It is part of a larger effort by the 
World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the 
world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at dnewhouse@worldbank.org or ppaci@worldbank.org.  
considerably across countries. For a given drop in gross 
domestic product, earnings declined more in countries 
with larger manufacturing sectors, smaller export 
sectors, and more stringent labor market regulations. In 
addition, overall employment became more sensitive to 
growth in gross domestic product. These findings have 
implications that go beyond the recent financial crisis 
as they highlight (i) the limitations of focusing policy 
responses on maintaining jobs and providing alterative 
employment or replacement income for the unemployed, 
and (ii) the critical role of fast-track data systems that are 
capable of monitoring ongoing labor market adjustment 
during economic downturns, in supporting the design of 
effective policy responses. 
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Introduction  
While policy responses to economic downturns tend to focus on protecting employment, evidence from the 
developing world shows that employment reduction is not the only, or even the most significant, effect. 
Although economic crises are difficult to predict, their recurrence is a salient feature of emerging market 
economies. Nevertheless, many developing countries continue to lack an effective policy infrastructure 
that can mitigate the impacts of economic downturns on employment opportunities. Moreover when this 
infrastructure  exists  it  mostly  focuses  on  either  maintaining  existing  jobs,  providing  alterative 
employment, or replacing income for workers that lose formal sector jobs via unemployment benefits. 
However,  job  losses  are  only  one  of  the  possible  ways  in  which  labor  markets  adjust  to  economic 
downturns and the prevailing adjustment mechanism depends on the nature of the shock and on the 
characteristics of both the economy and the labor market. During past crises, workers in developing 
countries typically faced large declines in hourly wages or to employment reallocation across sectors 
rather than major reductions in employment.
 2  
The experiences of the global downturn of 2008-2009 highlights a common disconnect between the labor 
market impact of crises and policy responses. Identifying the labor market channels through which the 
economic downturn is transmitted is a precondition for effective targeting of policy interventions.
3 If first-
round labor market adjustments are concentrated in specific jobs, sectors or geographic areas, targeted 
employment  interventions  to  protect  those  most  immediately  affected  may  effectively  mitigate  crisis 
impacts.If,  by  contrast,  most  of  the  adjustment  occurs  through  generalized  wage  declines,  standard 
employment-focus policies are not the most effective instruments to mitigate the impact of a crisis. But 
lack of fast-track data to monitor changes in main labor market indicators in a timely manner  often 
prevents  effective  targeting  of  policy  responses.  This  is  painfully  highlighted  by  the  disconnect—
described  is  some  detail  in  Robalino,  et  al  (2011)—between  the  prevailing  labor  market  adjustment 
experienced during the global downturn of 2008-2009 and the majority of policy responses implemented. 
Much  of  this  disconnect  was  due  to  the  lack  of  adequate  information  on  the  prevailing  adjustment 
mechanism in the developing world.  In general, most analysis of the magnitude and nature of labor 
market adjustments to the 2008 economic shock has been limited to OECD countries, and quantitative 
cross-country evidence on the impact of the great recession on labor market outcomes in developing 
countries has been scarce.
4 
This paper summarizes evidence from 45 middle income countries on how the 2008 crisis affected labor 
markets. There are four main findings. First, as in previous crises, adjustments occurred more through the 
quality of jobs than their quantity. For the average country in our sample, earnings growth slowed by 3 
times as much as employment growth, and unemployment changed little. Second, for several countries, 
hourly  wage  growth  did  not  collapse  and  the  adjustment  came  mainly  via  large  reductions in  hours 
worked. Third, while labor market adjustments generally tracked GDP declines, there was considerable 
                                                           
2 This was particularly true of the East Asian crisis in the late 1990’s (Betcherman and Islam, 2001, Fallon and 
Lucas, 2002) but it is also true for Mexico’s ―tequila‖ crisis which resulted in a drop in real wages of 21% between 
1994 and 1996 while aggregate employment increased slightly (McKenzie 2002).  
3 See for example Paci, et al (2011). 
4 The analysis of the present crisis in developing countries often focuses on changes in GDP (Calderon and Didier, 
2009), Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das (2010). Other analyses that focus on labor markets are sometimes based on 
simulations using pre-crisis data (Global Econometric Trends, 2009 & 2010, World Economic Outlook 2010, Habib 
et al, 2010)  3 
 
variation  in  outcomes  across  countries.  For  a  given  decline  in  GDP  growth,  countries  with  smaller 
manufacturing sectors, larger export sectors, and less costly redundancy regulations were better able to 
protect earnings. Finally, the responsiveness of employment growth to changes in GDP growth increased 
during the crisis, leading simple projections to understate the extent of employment loss during the crisis.   
Data and Methodology 
The paper uses data from published quarterly labor market statistics of 45 middle income countries. 37 of 
these  countries  have  information  on  both  GDP  growth  and  employment  growth,  while  31  have 
information on GDP growth and earnings growth. Most of the countries lie in Latin America or in the 
Europe and Central Asia region (ECA). We divide the remaining countries into two regions: East Asia 
and Sri Lanka, and the Middle East and Africa.
5 The main source of primary data sources on labor market 
and GDP are country statistics published by  the relevant country statistical offices and provided, on a 
subscription basis, to the World Bank  by three private data providers —Haver  Analytics,  CEIC,  and 
EMED—that collect them daily. These data were supplemented by ILO’s laborsta database.
6 Data on 
other country indicators--such as per capita GDP, and the size of the manufacturing and export sector--
come from the World Development Indicators database.   
 
Data coverage and sources vary across countries and indicators. GDP, employment, and unemployment 
statistics are available quarterly for almost all countries in the sample.
 7 Many countries, however, do not 
report earnings and even fewer provide hours. Moreover, hours and earnings are sometimes reported as 
changes in indices rather than levels. Since data are often missing for particular quarters, the analysis is 
limited to year-on-year changes for comparable quarters. Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix list the types 
of  surveys  used  to  generate  employment  and  earnings  indicators.  In  three  quarters  of  the  countries 
analyzed, employment statistics were derived from labor force surveys, while in the remaining one fourth, 
employment levels were obtained from establishment surveys or administrative data. As a result, in a 
quarter  of  countries  analyzed  employment  trends  may  refer  only  to  formal  employees.  By  contrast 
earnings data comes from establishment surveys in 70 percent of cases and the countries, and in these 
countries under-represents informal or self-employed workers. In a few countries, (Mexico, Colombia, 
and Turkey), earnings data from establishment surveys only cover the industrial or manufacturing sectors, 
and most countries in Eastern Europe only collect earnings data for non-agricultural workers. Finally 
employment and earnings data often do not cover the full country. At least 16% of countries – typically 
countries in Latin America, as well as China – only collect employment data in urban areas.  
 
Results should be interpreted with appropriate caution. Much of the analysis focuses on the change in the 
wage bill as a convenient summary measure of the total magnitude of the labor market adjustment borne 
by workers.  The wage bill is the product of employment and average monthly earnings. Given the nature 
of  the  data,  changes  in  the  wage  bills  often  reflect  changes  in  establishment  earnings  and  total 
employment. Many of these countries have large informal sectors and the cyclicality of earnings in formal 
and informal establishments may differ, adding additional uncertainty to our estimates of the precise role 
                                                           
5 The five countries from the Middle East and Africa are Egypt, The West Bank, South Africa, Morocco and 
Mauritius. 
6 A detailed list of sources and comments on the data are available from the authors upon request.  
7 Usually, quarterly data is available. However, Peru and Indonesia only have half-yearly results. 4 
 
of earnings in the adjustment process may not be precise. It is areassuring, however, that data on earnings 
from seven middle income countries also tend to show moderate to large earnings adjustments (Cho and 
Newhouse, 2011).  
 
The  analysis  compares  growth  rates  during  the  crisis  year  with  averages  over  the  prior  two  years. 
Focusing on the change in the growth rate, rather than post-crisis declines, is important to accurately 
measure  the  effect  of  the  crisis  relative  to  pre-crisis  trends.
8 Extending back two years allows a 
comparison with changes immediately preceding the crisis, while mitigating the influence of  the rapid 
price increases in food and fuel in 2008. GDP growth in crisis-affected countries fell sharply in the fourth 
quarter of 2008. Therefore, the post-crisis period includes the four quarters from Q4 2008 to Q3 2009, 
while the pre-crisis period includes the eight quarters from Q1 2006 to Q3 2008.
9   
The Extent and Nature of the Labor Market Adjustment 
 
The cost of the crisis to workers was considerable but delayed and gradual.  As shown in Figure 1 the 
average wage bill, which had been growing by nearly 10 percent over the pre-crisis years of 2007 and 
2008, came to a near standstill in 2009, with the growth dropping to less that 1 percent.
 10 The drop was 
only slightly less than the fall in GDP growth over this period (9.4 percentage points) but the decline in 
wage bill growth began later than that of GDP and continued longer. This is in line with findings from 
previous crisis that suggest long term impacts on workers may be deep and protracted.  
 
 
Figure 1: The employment adjustment was delayed and gradual 
                                                           
8 . A simple example makes this clear. China was far more affected by the financial crisis in 2009 than Morocco. But 
a simple comparison of post-crisis rates of growth would have given the false impression that Morocco suffered 
more. This is because Morocco’s GDP grew only half as fast China’s, even after the crisis, and employment growth 
in the two countries was nearly the same. However, in the pre-crisis period the Chinese economy had been growing 
more rapidly, so GDP growth slowed by 6 percentage points more in China than it did in Morocco. Employment 
growth also slowed by 3.5 percentage points more.  
9 Using eight quarters of pre-crisis data rather than four may mitigate the impact of the food and fuel crisis of 2007. 
10 The sample used to construct Figure 1 consists of the 24 countries that reported GDP growth, employment growth 
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Reduced growth of earnings was the main culprit for the slowdown in the wage bill.
 11 Real earnings 
growth began to decline in the first quarter of 2008, as increases in food and fuel prices led to accelerating 
inflation. The sharp decline in GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 was mirrored by a relatively 
large decline in nominal earnings growth: nearly three quarters of the 8.7 percentage point slowdown in 
the wage bill, among countries for which data is available, came from the reduction in earnings growth, 
which fell 6.5 percentage points.
 This is largely consistent with the evidence from past crises, as pointed 
out  in  the  introduction (For  more  details  see  footnote  1). The  simultaneous drop  in inflation  of  2.8 
percentage points, due to easing demand for commodities, prevented an even steeper drop in the wage bill 
and led to a small increase in the rate of real wage growth of 0.7 percentage points (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: For 8 countries - Hours pulled down earnings, while prices mitigated the impact 
 
Hours fell considerably in several countries.  The slowdown in hours tracks  closely the  reduction in 
earnings growth (See Figure 2).
12 On average, in the 14 countries for which data are available, growth in 
hours worked fell by a striking 7 percentage points but the drop was highly concentrated in  only half of 
these countries (Figure 3). The decline in hours worked not only accounted f or the entire decline in 
earnings but also allowed for a  slight increase in real hourly wages (0.7 percentage points)  (Figure 4). 
However, the extent to which the reduction in hours was an active policy response rather  than simply an 
adjustment mechanism is unclear. For example, an ILO survey of 54 countries (10 LICs, 10 lower middle 
income, 17 upper middle income and 17 HICs) shows that reductions in hours worked  was a common 
response to the downturn in countries as different as China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Argentina, Colombia and Jordan (ILO, 2009).   
                                                           
11 Table A1 in the appendix shows that these conclusions hold when examining pre and post-crisis average growth 
in a slightly larger sample of 28 countries that report quarterly, semi-annual, or annual data.  
12Figure 2, however, underestimates the extent of the fall in hours, because it only reflects the 8 countries that report 





























Decomposition of decline in 
wage bill growth
% due to real 
earnings
% due to 
employment
-20.0% 20.0% 60.0% 100.0%
% due to real wages
% due to hours
Decomposition of  decline 
in earnings growth
-500.0%-300.0%-100.0%100.0% 300.0% 500.0%
% due to nominal 
wages
% due to prices
Decomposition of 
increase in real wage 
growth
 
Figure 4 : Decomposing the change in the growth of wage bill, earnings and wage rates 
Because of the relatively minor impact of the downturn on employment, output per worker grew more 
slowly than in previous years. Among the 33 countries for which the relevant data is available GDP 
growth fell by 7.9 percentage points. Of that drop, just over 6 percentage points were due to a decline in 
growth in per adult GDP while slower employment growth rate contributed only 1.7 percentage points 
and activity rates added very little (only 0.1 percentage points) (Figure 5).
 13   This is consistent with the 
patterns for employment and hours discussed above; while employment growth slowed little, the growth 
rate of the number of hours worked dropped steeply, meaning that each worker spent less time producing 
output.  
                                                           
13 In line with our findings, some high income countries, like the US, had sharp rises in productivity – something 


























Figure 5: Decomposing the slowdown in the growth of GDP per adult 
But employment shifts out of more productive sectors also played an important role. Small aggregate 
employment  changes  masked  significant  shifts  out  of  industry  and  into  the  agricultural  and  service 
sectors.
14  The fall in industrial employment is not surprising, since manufacturing exports suffered during 
the crisis in many countries   and  entry barriers are lower for  family businesses in retail trade and 
agriculture, facilitating employment shifts into these sectors.
15 Even within the service and industrial 
sectors, however, the high productivity industrial and service sectors suffered most. Figure 6 below shows 
changes in employment growth across different sectors for a subsample of nine countries with available 
level of disaggregation.
16 Employment growth in  agriculture and  low-productivity service sector fell 
slightly (less than 1 percentage point ) while growth in high -productivity services fell 2.5 percentage 
points. Evidence from a larger sample of countries on more aggregate sectors suggests similar patterns. 
Both  activity and  unemployment  rates,  however,  were  largely  unaffected.  Contrary  to  evidence from 
previous crises, on average labor force participation rates remained almost unchanged (from 54.0 percent 
to  54.3  percent)  suggesting  that  added  and  discouraged  workers  effects  may  have  balanced  out. 
Unemployment rates also hardly changed (from 9.9 percent to 10.3 percent), In other words, while very 
mild added worker effects may have increased participation, a smaller share of those in the labor force 
were employed.
17  
                                                           
14 In the sample of 15 that report sectoral employment,  agricultural employment growth increased by 1.5 % points, 
service sector growth by 0.2 % points and industrial employment growth fell by 3.3% points 
15 Past crises  estimates suggest a similar story: during the 1997 Asian crisis, s ome 30-40% of displaced urban 
workers  are  estimated  to  have  moved  to  agricultural  jobs   (Manning  2000).  Evidence  indicates  that  worker 
reallocation and the quality of new jobs created are procyclical, rather than countercyclical  (Bowlus 1993). The 
returns to labor in these small -scale sectors are low, but displaced workers often lack better options during 
downturns (Mead and Liedholm 1998). 
16 High productivity services include: Transport and communications, real estate and financial services, and personal 
services. The remaining sectors, including public administration, real estate, education, hotel, retail trade, social 
work, and private household, are classified as low-productivity services.  
17 Reduced earnings may lead to a rise in labor market participation. Some crises appear to have driven more women 
and children into the labor market,  especially in rural areas (Manning 2000,  McKenzie 2004 and Ezemenari et al 
2003). However, in others participat ion rates appeared unresponsive. And in some cases underemployment rates 


























































Figure 6: Change in Employment Growth 
 
In which countries were adjustments unexpectedly large? 
Examining average labor market changes across such a varied sample of countries does not tell the 
whole story. While no country escaped the crisis unharmed, there was a great deal of heterogeneity across 
our sample of countries in the way labor markets adjusted. As suggested in the introduction, much of this 
heterogeneity is associated with fundamental differences in the severity of the shock, the structure of the 
economy, and the nature of labor market institutions. Figures 7 and 8 show how labor market outcomes 
varied according to the size of the shock. Countries more severely affected by the shock tended to adjust 
primarily through earnings, rather than employment. (Figure 7).
18 Nevertheless unemployment increased 
faster in countries with larger GDP declines ( Figure 8). However, both graphs clearly show substantial 
heterogeneity even for countries with identical GDP declines. This raises the question of which country 
characteristics helped cushion the labor market from the negative impact of economic shocks. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
South Korea in 1997/8 (Sarkar and Kumar, 2002), suggesting that workers had little ability to increase their labor 
supply. 
18 The left side of figure 8 shows an increasing divergence between earnings and employment effects as the size of 
the shock increases.   









Figure 7                    Figure 8 
To assess the role of these other factors, this paper classifies countries along seven dimensions. The first 
two are region and level of per capita GDP, which are intended to capture structural differences in the 
economy and in labor market institutions. Countries are also classified according to the relative size of the 
manufacturing  and  export  sector,  two  areas  of  the economy  where  crisis  impacts  were  most  severe. 
Exports were also affected by countries’ exchange rate regimes, as those with currencies pegged to the 
dollar suffering larger falls in exports, since the dollar appreciated roughly 15 percent against the Euro in 
the  latter  half  of  2008.
19 Finally,  countries are grouped according to their level of labor regulation 
(high/low) to investigate the expectation that stringent labor market regulations, if enforced, discouraged 
employers from shedding workers during a downturn. Two measures of firing costs from the 2009 Doing 
Business Indicators are used for this purpose: the difficulty of firing index and the firing cost.
20  Only a 
few of these characteristics are closely correlated with each other. 
21 
                                                           
19 We use the IMF’s de facto exchange rate-regime to classify countries by their currency regime. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2006/eng/0706.htm 
20 Countries are classified as high manufacturing, high export, difficult to fire,  and high firing cost countries, based 
on whether the indicator exceeds the median across countries in the sample. The difficulty of firing index  measures 
whether redundancy is allowed as a basis for terminating workers, and the existence of rendundancy regulations and 
requirements. The redundancy cost indicator measures the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments 
and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, expressed in weeks of salary Additional information on the 
redundancy indices is available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Surveys/EmployingWorkers.aspx 
21 In only 4 cases do the pair -wise correlations between characteristics exceed 0.25.Latin American countries are 
most likely to be upper middle income and least likely to be lower middle income. Europe and Central Asian 
countries and middle income MICS tend to have larger manufacturing sectors, but Latin American countries are less 
likely to have large manufacturing sectors. Finally, countries with high redundancy costs are far more likely to be in 
East Asia or Latin America than Europe, and are less likely to be middle income countries. Somewhat surprisingly, 
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Countries  with  larger  export  sectors, 
and  less  stringent  regulation  better 
maintained  previous  trends  in 
earnings  without  incurring  large 
employment costs. Figure 9 shows how 
earnings  and  employment  are 
associated  with  each  set  of  country 
characteristics after accounting for the 
declines  in  countries’  GDP  growth.
22  
The  most  striking  results  are  those 
associated  with  exports  and  firing 
regulations.  High  export  countries 
were  much  better  able  to  maintain 
earnings,  at  negligible  cost  to 
employment.  Countries  with  higher 
redundancy  costs  were  better  able  to 
protect employment, on the order of 1 
to 2 percentage points. However,  this 
may  have  partially  come  at  the 
expense of greater earnings reductions. 
Countries  with  more  costly  and 
cumbersome  firing  regulations  had 
two to three percentage point greater  
declines in earnings. The relationship 
between  firing  regulations  and 
earnings  declines  is  only  suggestive 
and  not  statistically  significant, 
however, due to the imprecision of the 
earnings measures. 
                                                           
22 Figure 9 reports coefficient estimates from 7 regressions. Each bar represents the coefficient from a regression of employment or earnings 
growth on the change in GDP growth, its square, cube, and quartic, and one set of dummy variables.Stars indicate significance level. For earnings 
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Higher firing costs are associated with 
smaller employment loss and higher 
earnings loss 
Change in employment growth
Change in earnings growth
Note: Bars indicate coefficients from fourteen separate  cross-sectional regressions 
of  changes in employment and earnings growth on change in GDP growth, data 
source, and each country characteristic. Stars indicate statistical significance at the 
10 , 5, and 1 percent level.  There  are 35 or 36 observations in the employment 
regressions and 30 or 31 in the earnings regressions. 
Figure 9 11 
 
Increases  in  unemployment,  after 
factoring  in  the  size  of  the  shock, 
were larger outside of Europe and in 
countries  with  higher  redundancy 
costs.  After  controlling  for  GDP 
growth,  unemployment  increases 
were  particularly  low  in  Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (Figure 10).  
This  suggests  that  concerns  that 
European  institutions  exacerbated 
unemployment  increases  during  the 
crisis  were  exaggerated,  at  least  for 
the  middle  income  European 
countries  in  our  sample.  Activity 
rates  and  unemployment  rates 
increased in higher-income countries, 
as laid-off workers in these countries 
were more able to afford to search for 
work,  in  part  perhaps  because 
spouses  or  younger  members  of  the 
household  rejoined  the  labor  force. 
Finally,  countries  with  higher 
redundancy  costs  experienced 
significantly  larger  increases  in 
unemployment.  During  the  crisis, 
unemployment  rates  increased  most 
for  youth,  who  may  have  faced 
particular  difficulty  obtaining 
employment in countries with higher 
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Unemployment rose less in European and 
lower redundancy cost countries 
Change in activity rate trend
Change in unemployment rate trend
Note: See notes from figure 10. All data are from household surveys. 
Unemployment regressions contain 36 or 37  observations, while activity 
regressions contain 29 observations. 
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How accurate were projections of employment changes?  
Employment became more sensitive to changes in GDP during the crisis. We estimated the relationship 
between  employment  growth  and  GDP  growth  before  and  after  the  crisis,  on  the  37  countries  that 
reported data for each of these variables. Our preferred estimates control for time-invariant characteristics 
of the country. They indicate that the employment elasticity rose during the crisis, from 0.16 before the 
crisis to 0.25 after the crisis (Table A4).
23   
This result is of importance since forecasts of employment changes are often based on methods that 
combine estimates of employment elasticities with GDP projections.   The ILO, for example, predicts 
present and future employment based on regressions of employment rates on GDP growth, controlling for 
time-invariant country characteristics (ILO, 2010, p.79). If the relationship between GDP growth and 
employment  growth  changes  during  the  crisis,  extrapolating  from  the  past  may  lead  to  inaccurate 
estimates of employment loss.  
Thus predictions based on pre-crisis elasticities significantly underestimated employment loss during the 
crisis.  Projections  of  employment  growth  derived  from  pre-crisis  elasticities  predicted  employment 
growth of 0.47 percent.  However, in the countries analyzed, employment actually declined on average, 
although  slightly,  by  -0.08  percent.  Therefore,  on  average  the  employment  estimates  overstated 
employment growth by 0.55 percentage points. This is a significant overestimate, given that employment 
growth in total declined about 2 percentage points.   
Table 1: Pre-crisis employment elasticities understated employment losses.  
  Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
Elasticity   0.16  0.25 
Average projected employment 
growth  (based on post-crisis GDP) 
  0.47 
Average actual employment growth  1.88  - 0.08 
Average overestimate of 
employment growth 
  0.55 
Average magnitude of discrepancy    1.9 
 
Forecasting employment changes on the basis of GDP alone typically produces inaccurate estimates for 
individual countries. The extent of the discrepancy between actual and predicted employment ranged 
from  -10.5  to  6.5  percentage  points.  On  average  across  the  countries,  the  prediction  was  off  by  a 
magnitude of 1.9 percentage points.
24    
From evidence to policy responses  
Evidence on labor market adjustments is an important input in the design of policy responses. While 
economic  growth  has  bottomed  out  and  appears  to  be  recovering  in  the  advanced  economies,  labor 
                                                           
23 These estimates come from regressions, based on quarterly data, of annual percent change in employment growth 
on annual percent change in employment, controlling for country fixed effects. Separate regressions were run for the 
8 quarters before the crisis and for the four during the crisis. Results are shown in appendix table A4. The increase in 
the employment elasticity from 0.16 to 0.25 is not statistically significant, but leads to economically meaningful 
discrepancies between predicted and actual employment.   
24 In other words, the average of the absolute value of the discrepancy across countries and quarters is 1.9  13 
 
markets recover more slowly and can often take years to bounce back from sharp downturns (Rogoff and 
Reinhardt, 2009). In the meantime, the nature of the labor market adjustment determines winners and 
losers.  For  example,  employment  declines  tend  to  concentrate  losses  among  an  unlucky  few,  while 
earnings declines spread losses more evenly amongst the workforce.  
 
The appropriate mix of policies to respond to the crisis depends partly on the nature of the labor market 
adjustment. Income replacement programs such as unemployment insurance or public works are most 
effective  in  mitigating  the  impact  of job  loss.  In  contrast,  when  the  labor  market  adjustment  occurs 
through earnings, then income maintenance program—such as cash transfers or income tax credits—
become particularly important. Targeting the working poor through income support programs is therefore 
a priority in these circumstances. 
25 
Most policies adopted in response to the crisis concentrated on employment generation.
26 During 
this crisis, support to SMEs was implemented by a larger share of developing countries than any other 
type of policy.
27 The follows a pattern seen in past crises, as  employment generation programs were 
implemented in response to past crises in Argentina, Mexico, Korea, and and Thailand. Meanwhile, wage 
subsidies were implemented in response to past crises  in Costa Rica, Argentina, and Malaysia. Public 
works programs have also been implemented in response to crises, as in Indonesia in 1998. None of these 
programs, however, directly benefited the informal secto r workers, and relatively few provide income 
support to workers who maintained their jobs.
28  
The emerging evidence presented in this paper suggests that effective policy packages should support 
earnings  and  household  income.  Responses  taken  in  European  OECD  countries  --  such  as  partial 
unemployment insurance, expanding cash transfers to poor workers, and temporary wage subsidies–may 
be priority interventions in those countries where hours and earnings adjustments dominated. 
                                                           
25 Surprisingly little is known about how well passive and active labor market program work during severe 
downturns, despite the large literature on the impact of active and passive labor market programs on labor market 
outcomes (Betcherman et al 2004; Fretwell et al 1999; Auer et al 2005),   
26 For more detail see Paci et al 2011  
27 This is according to a survey of policy responses to the crisis in 52 developing countries conducted by the World 
Bank and the International Labor Organization. See Robalino, Newhouse, and Rother (forthcoming) for details.  
28 Argentina and Mexico concentrate on employment generation while Brazil had a large unemployment insurance 
scheme (Marquez 2000). Costa Rica and Argentina also had wage subsidy programs.  Argentina’s Jefes program 
promoted employment in  Argentina’s private sector, to recover lost jobs in companies  with sufficient capacity 
(Marshall 2004). In Mexico, though there were not many legal reforms of labor market policies, changes took place 
largely through collective bargaining.  Social security reform was implemented in 1995, but did not involve changes 
in employer level contributions (Marshall 2004). In Korea, job creation and a Wage Claim Guarantee was the thrust 
of the policy response to the East Asian Crisis (Phang and Kim, 2001). They also had a job training program to 
encourage reemployment (Hur 2001). An Employment Insurance Scheme that was active from 1995 was extended 
to cover all enterprises in 2008 (Phang and Kim, 2001). Even in Thailand the emphasis of labor market policies in 
response to the crisis was direct job creation rather than self-employment. Informal workers were not protected, but 
likely to benefit from  ―income support activities‖  such  as tax reductions on VAT, price supports for rice, etc. 
(Betcherman and Islam 2001). In Indonesia, public works were mainly to provide emergency income and create 
social capital,  with  ultimate  goal to create a total of 226  million person-days of employment. While Malaysia 
already had a public works program in place, they initiated wage subsidies in August 1998. In response to the 1997 
crisis,  The  Philippines  initiated  an  Emergency  Loans  program,  while  providing  wage  subsidies  and  training 
(Betcherman and Islam 2001).  
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Sound diagnostics are also important to understand the causes and implications of different adjustment 
patterns.  Labor markets can adjust to downturns in different ways, with different implications for 
workers. The nature of these adjustments is at least partially determined by countries’ labor market 
policies and institutions, and has important implications for the welfare of the poor. Future downturns are 
bound to occur, and additional research based on sound labor market diagnostics can help unravel the link 
between policies and institutions, labor market adjustments, and outcomes for the poor.  




Table A1: Average Changes in Labor Market Indicators, Before and After the Crisis  
 
Indicator  Number of 
countries 




GDP growth  28  7.3  -2.4  -9.7 
Wage bill growth  28  9.4  1.1  -8.3 
Employment growth  28  1.8  -0.2  -2.0 
Earnings growth  28  7.3  1.3  -6.0 
Hours worked growth  14  1.7  -5.2  -6.9 
Real wage  growth  14  6.5  7.2  0.7 
Nominal wage growth  14  12.9  12.2  -0.7 
CPI growth  14  7.0  6.0  -1.0 
Unemployment rate  28  9.0  9.7  0.7 
Participation rate  24  53.0  53.3  0.3 
Notes: Pre-crisis period is an average of year on year changes over eight quarters from Q3 2006 to Q32008. Post-crisis period is 
an average between Q4 2008 and Q3 2009.  
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A.2 Table A2: Country  summary  





Change in growth rate   
(percentage points)  
  Employment  Earnings      GDP   Wage Bill   Employment   Earnings   Hours 
East Asia          -5.64  -5.38  -0.14  -5.13  0.22 
Urban China  Firm  Firm  LMIC  Mild  -5.00  0.88  -1.52  2.55   
Indonesia  Household  Household  LMIC  Mild  -1.81  -3.98  -1.53  -2.39  0.22 
Malaysia  Household  N/A  HMIC  Medium  -8.92    0.21     
Philippines  Household  Legislated  LMIC  Mild  -4.68  -1.59  0.62  -2.26   
Sri Lanka  Household  Legislated  LMIC  Mild  -3.76  -19.52  1.38  -20.93   
Thailand  Household  Household  MIC  Medium  -9.68  -2.67  0.03  -2.65   
Europe/Central 
Asia 
         -11.84  -11.30  -2.70  -8.32  -5.66 
Albania  Household  N/A  LMIC  Mild  -0.16    0.89     
Armenia  Household  Firm   LMIC  Severe  -24.31  -13.77  -0.84  -9.39   
Belarus  Household  Firm  MIC  Medium  -7.48  -5.07  -2.12  -3.15   
Bosnia 
/Herzegovina 
Firm  Firm  MIC     N/A    -17.26     
Bulgaria  Firm  Firm  MIC  Medium  -9.07  -6.29  -5.66  -0.04  -0.01 
Georgia  Firm  N/A  HMIC  Severe  -13.31    -1.19     
Kazakhstan  Household  Firm  MIC  Medium  -7.87  -1.09  -2.16  1.04   
Kyrgyz Republic  Firm  Firm  LMIC  Medium  -7.82    -0.44     
Latvia  Household  Firm  HMIC  Severe  -21.92  -28.68  -6.20  -22.47  -0.23 
Lithuania  Household  Firm  HMIC  Severe  -20.08  -22.30  -6.19  -16.35   
Macedonia  Household  Household  MIC  Medium  -6.35  12.11  0.10  11.57   
Moldova  Household  Firm  LMIC  Medium  -7.78  -4.25  -3.28  0.08   
Montenegro  Household  N/A  HMIC     N/A    1.31     
Poland  Household  Firm  HMIC  Mild  -4.75  -8.39  -2.83  -5.31  -0.31 17 
 
Romania  Household  Firm  MIC  Severe  -12.20  -8.69  -0.95  -9.50  -0.28 
Russia  Household  Firm  MIC  Severe  -14.96  -20.11  -3.86  -15.87   
Serbia  Household  Firm  LMIC  Medium  -7.62  -18.67  -3.42  -15.71  -18.84 
Tajikistan  Household  Household  LMIC     N/A    1.03     
Turkey  Household  Household  HMIC  Severe  -12.42  -9.60  2.69  -12.49  -14.29 
Ukraine  Firm  Firm  LMIC  Severe  -23.10  -23.45  -3.68  -18.90   
Latin America           -6.82  -5.35  -1.89  -2.47  -5.08 
Urban Argentina  Household  Firm  HMIC  Medium  -5.72  1.42  -0.91  2.39  -11.59 
Urban Brazil  Household  Firm  MIC  Medium  -7.14  -1.60  -1.30  -0.25  -6.22 
Chile  Firm  Firm  HMIC  Medium  -6.46  -0.76  -2.14  1.45   
Urban Colombia  Household  Firm  MIC  Medium  -7.14  -5.17  -1.55  -3.46  -1.85 
Urban Ecuador  Household  Household  LMIC  Mild  -4.05  -8.34  -0.72  -1.32   
Jamaica  Household  N/A  MIC  Mild  -3.17    -3.75     
Mexico  Household  Firm  HMIC  Medium  -9.49  -18.13  -2.73  -15.50  -9.72 
Peru  Firm  Firm  MIC  Medium  -8.17  -2.17  -2.14  0.12  -3.39 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Household  N/A  HMIC     N/A    0.03     
Uruguay  Household  Household  HMIC  Medium  -5.27      2.36  2.29 
Venezuela  Household  Firm  HMIC  Medium  -7.72  -8.04  -1.27  -6.61   
Dominican 
Republic 
Firm  Industry  MIC  Medium  -9.10    -4.38     
Paraguay  N/A  Firm  LMIC  Medium  -8.40      -3.85   
Middle 
East/Africa 
         -2.80  -5.71  -2.25  0.25  1.89 
Egypt  Household  N/A  LMIC  Mild  -2.58    -3.61     
Jordan  Household  N/A  HMIC  Medium  -5.76         
Mauritius  Household  N/A  MIC  Mild  -3.31    -3.69     
South Africa  Household  Household  MIC  Medium  -5.88  -5.71  -4.10  -1.53   
West Bank/Gaza 
Strip 
Household  Household  HMIC  Mild  -0.40      2.04  1.89  
 
A.3 Table A3: Data discrepencies.  
Indicator  Coverage/Source  Number of countries 
Employment 
Whole country  27 
Only urban   6 
Unclear/Largely urban   4 
     
Employment 
Only formal  3 
All persons  28 
Unknown  7 
Total  37 
     
Employment 
LFS/HHS  29 
Establishment survey  8 
Total  37 
     
Earnings 
Industry/Non agriculture  9 
All sectors  19 
Unknown  3 
  Total  31 
     
Earnings 
LFS/HHS   7 
Establishment survey  22 
 Legislated   2 
Total   31 
     
Note: Excludes Bosnia and Herzogovina, Montenegro, and Tajikistan due to lack of GDP data.   
Table A4: Regression results from elasticity regressions  
   FE  POLS  RE 















GDP growth  0.160*  0.252***  0.0230  0.199***  0.0897  0.225*** 
Constant  0.726  0.282***  1.719***  0.205  1.190**  0.200 
Observations  244  144  244  144  244  144 
R-squared  0.035  0.276  0.001  0.247     
Number of 
countries 
37  37        37  37 
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